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Abstract
While virtually all currency crisis models recognise that the fate of a currency peg depends on
how tenaciously policy makers defend it, they seldom model how this is done. We incorporate
the mechanics of speculation and the interest rate defence against it in the model of Morris
and Shin (American Economic Review 88, 1998). Our model captures that the interest rate
defence reduces speculators’ profits and thus postpones the crisis. It predicts that well
before the fall of a currency interest rates are increased to offset the buildup of exchange
market pressure, and this then unravels in a sharp depreciation. This pattern is at odds with
predictions of standard models, but we show that it fits well with reality.
Key words: Exchange Market Pressure, Currency Crisis, Interest Rate Defence, Global Game.
JEL Codes: E58, F31, F33, G15.
1. Introduction
While virtually all modern currency crisis models recognise that the decision to abandon a
currency peg depends on how tenaciously policy makers are willing to defend it, they seldom
model in detail how this is done. Yet during the onset of a crisis much of the pressure on the
exchange rate manifests itself through policy actions aimed at defending the currency peg,
instead of through the ultimate decision whether to devalue or not. Policy makers undertake
actions aimed at increasing the financing costs of speculators. In particular they raise the
interest rate.
In this paper, we argue that a model that endogenously incorporates this interest rate
defence captures decisive features of currency crises that are not captured by models that
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merely focus on the devaluation decision. We add it to the micro-founded global game
currency crises model (Morris and Shin, 1998), which has been prominent in recent literature
(see e.g. Corsetti et al. (2004), Goldstein (2005), Guimaraes and Morris (2007)). We also bring
in the mechanics of speculation more explicitly. In our model, the policy maker is willing to
increase the interest rate to offset the build up of pressure on exchange markets. This makes
speculation riskier, and speculators postpone attacking the currency peg until the expected
devaluation compensates for the risks they have to take. This idea is the main difference
between our model and other approaches. It is the reason why our model outperforms
traditional currency crisis models at explaining two salient features of how currency crises
develop in reality. We illustrate this using empirical data from the EMS and East Asian crises.
Concretely, we focus on the following two empirically verifiable predictions regarding
the onset, timing, and aftermath of the attack. First, our model implies that if an attack
is successful, it will be followed by a substantial jump of the exchange rate. The resulting
jump of the exchange rate is contrary to the predictions of the earliest, “first generation”
models of currency crises, and, as we will argue in greater detail, essentially also contrary
to the predictions of more basic global game currency crisis models, but it is in accordance
with reality. Although a jump in the exchange rate is in principle consistent with “second
generation”, multiple equilibria models, in these models a currency crisis is triggered by a
sudden and exogenous shift in sentiment, which leaves the reason for the jump unexplained,
in contrast to our model.
Second, our model implies that stress on exchange markets may be observed, through
elevated interest rates, well before a crisis fully hits and the currency falls. Neither first
generation models nor the basic global game model predict an extended period of stress
preceding the fall of the currency, since these models do not explain well why speculators
would postpone attacking it. Similarly, second generation models do not provide a reason
why stress should be visible before the currency falls, since the collapse is triggered by an
exogenous shift in sentiment.
Measuring stress on foreign exchange markets is exactly the focus of an empirical literature
on exchange market pressure, originating with Girton and Roper (1977). To measure pressure,
this literature uses a combination of data on exchange rates and data on policy actions that
ward off stress. Our currency crisis model with endogenous policy responses brings these
two faces of pressure together in a hybrid model and thus connects the theoretical currency
crisis literature to the literature on exchange market pressure. Using this connection, we
demonstrate the model’s implication of a build-up of pressure before the fall of the currency
that culminates into a sharp depreciation, and we show that it fits well with reality.
Of course, there are a number of other papers that are concerned with improving the empirical
performance of the traditional currency crisis models, and a subset of these are explicit about
how policy makers may defend against speculative attacks. However, none of these explicitly
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deals with the basic question of how the defence of the currency peg affects the profits that
speculators hope to make from the attack, in other words, why such a defence works at all,
and which empirical implications follow from this. While for instance Flood and Jeanne
(2005) study the efficacy of an interest rate defence, they focus primarily on how the defence
affects the sustainability of other government policies, in particular fiscal policy. Drazen
(2000) considers a game theoretic signalling model in which the central bank increases the
interest rate in order to signal the market of its intention of a dogged defence of the peg.
Broner (2008) analyses a model in which a fraction of agents know the level reserves that the
of central bank commits to defending the currency peg, and focuses on the effects of private
information.
Closer to our work on defence policies are some recent global game models of speculative
attacks. In Angeletos et al. (2007) the central bank sets the interest rate just before speculators
move. Speculators are unsure about the policy maker’s eagerness to keep the peg, and
view the interest rate defence as a signal of her tenacity. Angeletos et al. point out that
the interest rate may transmit information about a policy maker’s intentions in an intricate
way, and that this may lead to multiple equilibria. Similarly, Angeletos and Werning (2006)
and Hellwig et al. (2006) study global game models with multiple equilibria in which agents
infer information through other channels, particularly prices and interest rates, rather than
through information on fundamentals alone. The focus of these papers is on learning and
inference in this non-trivial information structure. We share the view that studying such
informational channels is an important line of research, but nevertheless believe that a
number of crucial features of currency crises follow from more primitive aspects of the
mechanics of attack and defence.
Our setup stays close to the original model of Morris and Shin (1998). In our model, all
agents are aware of the strategic intentions of the policy maker, and there are no substantial
asymmetries of information across agents. There are, however, two crucial differences with
the model of Morris and Shin, which are central to our results. First, in our model, actions of
speculators are not obvious strategic complements. A larger amount of speculators attacking
the peg may lead to a harsher defence by the policy maker, which means that the costs of
speculation are higher. In this case, actions become strategic substitutes. Because Morris
and Shin do not model the interest rate defence, they do not have to deal with this effect.
Nevertheless, we show that our model has a unique equilibrium in threshold strategies, thus
generalise their result to our setting.
Second, in contrast to the sequential timing structure adopted by Morris and Shin—in
which speculators act first and the policy makers subsequently responds to their actions—in
our model speculators and the policy maker act simultaneously. We believe this approach
is more natural, since in reality, during crises, these agents react to each others’ behaviour,
without one particular party being the leader. In addition, this structure avoids the complica-
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tions introduced by the informational channels in the global game models mentioned above.
This means that we can fully focus on the cost-wise implications of raising the interest rate
during an attack, in particular on how this affects the strategic decisions of speculators and
the devaluation outcome.
The rest of the text is structured as follows. We motivate and develop our model in sections 2
through 4. In section 5, we prove that the model has a unique equilibrium. We compare the
implications of our model with related empirical and theoretical literature in sections 6 and
7, and show how our model improves upon traditional currency crisis models. In section 8,
we conclude. Proofs of lemmata and our main theorem appear in the appendix.
2. TheMechanics of Speculation
We develop a stylised approach to modelling a speculative attack on a currency peg, aiming
to incorporate the most important features of such attacks. A good overview of the precise
mechanics of speculative attacks can be found in an explanatory note by the International
Monetary Fund (Folkers-Landau et al. 1997). Since these mechanics are the basis for the rest
of our analysis, we briefly sketch them here.
2.1. Speculative Attacks in Practice
A speculative position against a weak currency is generally implemented by taking a short
position in that currency in the forward market for foreign exchange (“forex”). Speculators
enter into forward contracts with banks, selling the weak currency for a strong currency at
some future date against a prearranged rate. Concretely, let ft denote the “one-period-ahead”
forward rate and st+1 denote the exchange rate in the spot market at the time of maturity
of the forward contract, both expressed logarithmically. The forward rate and spot rate are
expressed as units of the domestic currency per unit of the foreign currency, and we will
assume that the domestic currency is the weak currency. At the time of maturity of the
forward contract, speculators conduct off-setting transactions on the spot market, by selling
strong currency for weak currency. This way, they earn st+1− ft on each unit of the strong
currency (neglecting transaction costs). Speculators make profits if st+1 > ft .
After signing the forward contracts, the banks involved face currency mismatches, be-
cause a forward transaction at time t maturing at t +1 entails a long position in the weak
currency. Due to standard risk balancing practises, the bank will immediately try to counter
the mismatches that the forward transactions create by selling the weak currency spot already
at time t . These spot sales lead to instantaneous pressure on the weak currency at time t .
This is a crucial part of the mechanics of speculative attacks.
To support the weak currency, the domestic central bank has several instruments. Two
instruments that are important in practice are active intervention on the forex markets, and
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setting a high domestic interest rate. Raising interest rates may have three effects, which are
standard but central to our approach. First, it increases the forward rate ft speculators face,
and thus deters speculation. To see how, note that the spot sale transforms a bank’s currency
mismatch into a maturity mismatch. Therefore, a forex swap with a third party is necessary
to close off positions. The third party will compare the returns of holding the weak currency
with revenue obtained by entering the swap. Thus, for the bank the cost of entering into
the swap contract will reflect the third party’s forgone interest. The income from the bank’s
forward and spot transactions, ft − st , must compensate for this cost. Assume, for simplicity,
that deposits in the strong currency earn no interest. Then the bank will set ft − st equal to
the domestic interest rate. This reflects the covered interest rate parity (CIP) condition. If
there is a large demand for forward contracts and no private third party is willing to carry out
the swap, the bank obtains credit in the weak currency from the central bank against ceiling
interest rates, and these costs are passed on to speculators, so that CIP also holds. In the rest
of the paper we will abstract from the precise mechanics of the pricing of swaps, and assume
the bank sets ft using the CIP condition, fully in line with the ideas just sketched.
The second effect of the interest rate is on other agents that are active on the forex
market whose desired positions in the weak currency are influenced by the interest rate.
Quintessential examples of the kinds of agents that we have in mind are carry-traders. There
may be others: forex traders and arbitrageurs of other banks, also perhaps of parties outside
the banking system (traders on the goods market, hedge funds and large pension funds,
etc.). These other agents may refuse to hold large positions in the weak currency at the
prevailing fixed exchange rate in times of tension on the forex market, unless the currency
risk is compensated by a sufficiently high domestic interest rate.
Lastly, an interest rate defence of the weak currency may also have adverse consequences.
Increasing interest rates too much, or for a prolonged period of time, may have detrimental
effects on economic activity and therefore increase the costs of maintaining the currency peg,
weakening its credibility. The policy maker may, therefore, refuse to raise interest rates above
a certain level. (A number of models explicitly address the economic costs of high interest
rates, for instance Flood and Jeanne (2005) and Lahiri and Végh (2007).)
2.2. A Stylised Model of Speculative Trade
Currency trade during an episode of high exchange market pressure is a continuous interplay
between different kinds of actors on financial markets, including central banks, where each
action of some agent rapidly provokes reactions of the rest of the market. However, for the
purpose of analysing speculative attacks, economists often have access to data of much lower
frequency, e.g. weekly or monthly. In what follows, we will develop a model of speculative
trade that is stylised enough to give clear implications for the exchange rate for such low
frequencies, and preserves the intuitions sketched in the previous section (in particular that
increasing the interest rate deters speculation).
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In line with our discussion of the mechanics of speculative attacks in practice, we consider
an economy populated by four kinds of agents:
(I) A group of risk neutral speculators, speculating against the weak currency by entering
into forward contracts with banks;
(II) Commercial banks, that offer forward contracts to speculators and aim to reduce the
resulting balance sheet mismatches through spot sales of the weak currency;
(III) A policy maker that controls the central bank and manipulates the forex market using
interest rates, in order to stabilize the exchange rate;1
(IV) A group of other traders, that will have to take on the role of counterpart to the spot
market transactions induced by speculation, and are willing to do so if the domestic
interest rate makes this sufficiently attractive.
The focus of the model is on how the mechanics of speculation and of a defence policy
against it affect the decisions made by these agents in a given period, where the intended
interpretation of a period is the time-unit of analysis for an empirical application (a month, in
our own empirical analysis). This “intra-period” model can be used to analyse what happens
over multiple periods by iterating it.
The group of other traders have a passive role in our model, and are discussed further
below.2 To disentangle the interplay of the decisions of the other agents, we assume that—in
a given period—the decision of the policy maker occurs simultaneously with the decisions of
the banks and speculators. We choose this approach for two reasons. First, this simultaneous
set-up captures the continuous interaction between all types of agents in reality in a stylised
way. It implies that neither the policy maker at the central bank, nor the commercial banks,
nor the speculators are a “leading” party in the sequence of intra-day events; in contrast they
react to each others’ behaviour. Second, developing a more complex dynamical model of
intra-day trade would not lead to the tractable results we are after.
In fact, the assumption that the speculators, the banks, and the policy maker act simulta-
neously leads to a key difference in the timing of events between our model and most second
generation models of speculative attacks (e.g. Obstfeld (1996), and also Morris and Shin
(1998)). These models have the following sequential structure. Speculators choose whether
to attack the currency peg in the first stage of the game. The policy maker only acts at the
second stage, at which it simply decides whether to abandon the peg or not. Since speculators
have already committed to their decision at this point, the actions of the policy maker will
1A defence strategy is often developed at the Ministry of Finance, and implemented by the central bank.
2These agents function to ensure that the spot market clears at some exchange and interest rate pair, and
consequently to be able to determine a price for the currency when there is an excessive supply of it from banks.
This is similar to the fundamental traders considered in Morris and Shin (2004).
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Figure 1: Intra-period timing
not influence the decisions made by speculators any more, which is at odds with reality and
the intent of our paper. Interestingly, Angeletos et al. (2007) consider the reverse approach:
the policy maker acts at the first stage, before the actual attack occurs, and the speculators
decide in the second stage. Speculators are unsure about the policy makers intentions to
defend or not, so that the interest rate primarily functions as a signalling device, instead of an
instrument to defend the currency peg.
In order to develop an approach where the actions of the policy maker influence the
decisions of the speculators, and the policy maker responds to the level of speculation rather
than signalling intentions, we avoid both of these sequential structures. This makes our
model more realistic. As we detail below, a consequence of our approach is that (due to the
simultaneity) banks do not observe the actual costs associated with closing off positions (that
is, the interest rate), but form rational expectations about these costs based on a slightly noisy
signal on economic fundamentals. This may be interpreted as some uncertainty that results
from operating on tumultuous forex markets during times of crises.
Assume a currency peg is in place, so that st = s˜ in each period t , as long as the policy maker
does not abandon the peg. The model consists of two important parts, as detailed in figure
1. Most of the action in our model occurs at t0. At this moment, speculators are matched to
banks. Banks offer forward contracts to the speculators, and speculators decide whether or
not to speculate against the weak currency through short sales.
When speculators enter into contracts with banks, the actions of the banks and spec-
ulators combined lead to speculative pressure. However, a crucial distinction between
speculators and banks is that speculators take risky positions in the hope of making profits,
while banks aim to minimise risk. As discussed, banks take two steps to close off positions.
First, speculative activity generates spot sales by commercial banks, and thus leads to supply
of the domestic currency on the spot market. We label this supply λt and assume λt ∈ [0,1].
The policy maker instructs the central bank to buy any excess supply of the weak currency
from the commercial banks at time t0 against the exchange rate s˜. This “accommodating”
intervention guarantees that at t0, the commercial banks can sell the weak currency at the
guaranteed rate s˜—a guaranteed exchange rate is an essential feature of a fixed exchange rate
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regime in reality.
The second step that banks will need to take to close off positions is to enter into swap
contracts. The costs of swaps are influenced by the policy maker’s interest rate policy. The
banks aim to pass on these costs to the speculators when they set the forward rate, so
that a policy of setting a high interest rate reduces speculative activity. As noted, in our
stylised setting banks do not immediately observe the actual costs associated with closing off
positions, but form rational expectations about them, setting forward rates accordingly. This
is because the policy maker sets the interest rate, rt , at t0 simultaneously with the decisions
of banks and speculators.
Besides the direct effect of reducing speculative activity, a higher interest rate induces
other traders to be the counterparty to spot market transactions. For simplicity, we assume
that these other traders trade only at t1 and that their demand for the weak currency is strictly
increasing in rt . The aim of the policy maker is to set the interest rate in such a way that the
t1 spot market clears at the fixed rate and that the central bank ends the period with a certain
desired net position in the weak currency. We simply assume this position to be zero, though
in more intricate models a target could be given in by other considerations. Thus, concretely,
in our model at time t1 the t1-traders will have to absorb any excess supply that the central
bank has bought from the commercial banks, and the spot market rate prevailing at time t1
will have to equal s˜, for the peg to be defended in a successful and sustainable way. If the peg
is not successfully defended, the currency devalues until the spot market clears.
To complete the description of the model, in the next sections we investigate the decision
problems for the speculators, the banks, and the policy maker more closely. We first treat the
decisions of the policy maker in full, derive her optimal interest rate policy, and then move
on to the banks and the speculators and derive their optimal strategies. Subsequently, we
characterise the equilibrium situation in which all agents make their decisions optimally.
3. The PolicyMaker’s Interest Rate Defence
The policy maker has a domestic interest rate target based on the desire to realise certain
domestic policy objectives. Under the currency peg, this target must be subordinated to her
objective of keeping the exchange rate fixed, so it is not realised as long as the peg remains in
place. In what follows, assume ut is the realisation of a fundamental that affects the policy
maker’s domestic target rate, rd (ut ) (say, unemployment). An increase in ut is interpreted as
a worsening of the fundamental. As the fundamental worsens, the policy maker would prefer
a looser interest rate policy, so that the derivative r ′d ≤ 0.
Suppose that setting rt = rd (ut ) results in excess supply of weak currency on the spot
market when the exchange rate is equal to s˜. This has implications for the interest rate
decision of the policy maker. To maintain the peg, the policy maker will have to increase the
interest rate to achieve equilibrium on the end-of-period spot market. Let r (ut ,λt , st ) denote
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the interest rate that clears the spot market against exchange rate st when the fundamental is
ut and speculative pressure is equal to λt . In particular, the interest rate r (ut ,λt , s˜) clears the
spot market against the fixed exchange rate s˜. To simplify notation, we denote this particular
interest rate by r (ut ,λt ), where the restriction to the peg s˜ is implicitly understood.
We assume r is strictly increasing in λt —since speculative activity generates spot market
sales by banks which have to be absorbed by other traders—and strictly decreasing in st .
These two assumptions reflect the sensitivity of the demand of t1-traders to the interest rate
and the exchange rate. Furthermore, we make the natural assumption that r is increasing
in ut —a worsening fundamental makes holding the currency less attractive, other things
equal. Finally, we assume that r is continuously differentiable, and throughout the paper we
maintain the following assumption on the derivatives of r :
If both r (ut ,λt )= r (uˆt , λˆt ) and ut < uˆt , (1)
then rut (ut ,λt )< rut (uˆt , λˆt ) and rλt (ut ,λt )≤ rλt (uˆt , λˆt ).
In words, we compare the situation where the fundamental equals ut with one where the
fundamental is worse, equaling uˆt . If in both situations the interest rate has to be raised to
the same level rt in order to clear the spot market, then this market clearing interest rate
is more sensitive to a further worsening of the situation, that is a further worsening of the
fundamental or increase in speculative pressure under uˆt as it is under ut . This assumption
thus states that raising the interest rate to defend the peg becomes a less effective defence
policy as the economic situation worsens, which we think is natural.
As argued in the previous section, increasing the interest rate may have detrimental
effects on the economy. Assume that the maximum interest rate the policy maker is willing
to use is r (ut ), where r is a continuously differentiable and strictly decreasing function of
ut , with derivative r
′ bounded away from 0. This amounts to the idea, crucial for all second
generation models, that the policy maker is more averse to defending the peg under bad
fundamentals than under good fundamentals. If r (ut ,λt )> r (ut ), then the interest rate that
clears the spot market exceeds the maximum rate that the policy maker is willing to use
to defend the currency peg, and thus the policy maker would prefer to abandon it. In this
case, she prefers to set the interest rate to the domestic interest rate target rd (ut ) < r (ut )
and the weak currency devalues. If r (ut ,λt )≤ r (ut ), the policy maker prefers to defend the
peg and set rt = r (ut ,λt ), so that indeed st = s˜. The policy maker’s optimal decision can be
characterised as follows.
Lemma 1. There exists a continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing function λt 7→ u∗(λt ),
with compact range [`,h], such that the policy maker prefers to devalue if and only if ut >
u∗(λt ).
Figure 2 gives a graphical representation of this characterisation. If ut < `, the policy maker
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Figure 2: Characterising the decision to devalue or defend
does not abandon the peg for any value of λt ∈ [0,1]. If ut > h the policy maker never defends
the peg, whatever λt . If ut is in the region between ` and h, then the optimal decision
depends on the amount of speculative pressure λt . The weak currency is “ripe for attack”, and
a currency crisis can be triggered if a sufficiently large number of speculators attack the weak
currency. This tripartite classification is familiar from the literature on second generation
currency crisis models (see Jeanne (1997) or Morris and Shin (1998)). The function u∗ is also
instrumental to characterise the policy maker’s optimal interest rate decision as a function of
λt and ut . This is given by:
r ∗(ut ,λt )=
r (ut ,λt ) if ut ≤ u
∗(λt );
rd (ut ) if ut > u∗(λt ).
(2)
4. The Decisions of Banks and Speculators
4.1. A Global Game Approach
What will speculators do in the region [`,h], the region where the currency is ripe for attack?
Following Morris and Shin (1998) and related literature, we will apply the global game tech-
nique of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) to resolve this question. The essential idea behind
the global game technique is to follow a modelling approach that allows for a lack of common
knowledge about the fundamental among agents. To this end, we assume that at the start of
the period, the true value of the fundamental ut is determined. At this moment, each bank
and each speculator is endowed with some very precise private information about the true
value of ut , and this fact is common knowledge among agents. However, the actual value of
ut remains unknown to speculators and banks, so that there can be no common knowledge of
the fundamental itself. Like in Morris and Shin (1998), the policy maker observes ut perfectly.
Concretely, assume there is a large set of speculators, indexed on the real interval [0,1]. At
t0, each speculator is matched to a single bank—for notational simplicity we assume that
speculator i is matched to bank i . At this stage, the speculator and the bank may enter into a
forward contract. Observe that, in principle, any forward rate offered by bank i to speculator
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i conveys some of the bank’s information about ut , since the forward rate is set based on
the bank’s information about ut . Similarly, the decision of the speculator i to enter into the
forward contract or not reveals some of her information on ut to bank i . The final contract
should reflect an informational equilibrium between both parties.3 We assume that, based
on their ideas about the fundamental, both parties conclude that the true value of ut is close
to some xi t ∈R. This xi t will be called the signal of speculator i and bank i , and is uniformly
distributed around ut :
xi t ∼U (ut −²,ut +²), with ² fixed and 2²< h−`, (3)
so that the signal xi t noisily reflects the true fundamental. Signals are idiosyncratic and
independently and identically distributed across all the bank-speculator pairs, and it is
known to all agents that signals are distributed according to (3). From the perspective of
speculator and bank i , the true fundamental ut is in the set Xi t = [xi t −², xi t +²], and each
value is equally likely.
A strategy for a bank is a decision rule σbi t : xi t 7→ fi t , where fi t is the forward rate offered
when the bank’s signal is equal to xi t . The forward rate that is offered may differ from bank
to bank, which is actually a realistic feature of forex trade since in reality forex markets—
including forward markets—are highly decentralised. A strategy for a speculator is a decision
rule σsi t : (xi t , fi t ) 7→ di t ; where di t is the short position of the speculator when her signal
is equal to xi t and the forward rate offered is fi t . A joint strategy profile is a sequence σt
that assigns a strategy to each speculator and each bank. Finally, a joint strategy profile is
symmetric if σsi t =σsj t and σbi t =σbj t for all i , j ∈ [0,1].
4.2. The Bank’s Decision Problem
Based on the signal xi t , bank i offers the forward rate fi t =σbi t (xi t ) to speculator i . Bank i
wishes to set this forward rate at a level that properly reflects the costs associated with signing
a forward contract at time t0, as discussed in section 2. Its optimal strategy is to set:4
fi t = s˜+E [rt |xi t ] , (4)
where E [rt |xi t ] is the interest rate it expects to prevail. As explained in section 2.2, the expec-
tations operator appears here because of our “simultaneous action” global game approach.
The condition in equation (4) is therefore the no-arbitrage condition for the forward market
in our setting, since it entails that at the moment t0, when forward contracts are signed and
3Note that there is a theoretical justification for this approach. See the arguments, and the theorem on the
coincidence of posteriors in this case, as put forward by Aumann (1976).
4Given that individual banks are small and have no influence on the behaviour of the policy maker, we can
derive their optimal strategies while treating E [rt |xi t ] as being fixed. Like before, we assume that the foreign
interest rate equals zero.
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the exchange rate is fixed at s˜, no ex ante profitable, covered, forward market transactions
can be made. When the policy maker is expected to increase the interest rate, the forward
market tightens, that is, fi t increases.
4.3. The Speculator’s Decision Problem
While it is impossible to enter into ex ante profitable covered forward market transactions, it
is possible to enter into ex ante profitable uncovered forward market transactions, because
the currency peg may be abandoned at time t1. Essentially, the policy maker may create a
“window of opportunity” for speculators by guaranteeing the exchange rate s˜, but refusing to
set the interest rate high enough to rule out gains in case she is forced to abandon this rate.
This is precisely how speculators hope to make profits.
The speculator who is matched to bank i is offered the forward rate fi t . This forward rate
represents the cost involved with speculation. The speculator may gain from speculation
if the policy maker abandons the currency peg and the resulting devaluation is sufficiently
large. If the prevailing peg is abandoned, it is not a priori clear what will be the exchange rate
that can be expected to prevail at the date of maturity of the forward contracts (t +1). We
assume that, conditional on a collapse of the peg at time t1, the time t0 expectation of the
spot market rate that prevails in period t +1, set+1, depends on the current values of λt and ut :
set+1(ut ,λt )− s˜
= 0 if ut ≤ u
∗(λt );
≥ rd (ut ) if ut > u∗(λt ).
The expected amount of devaluation, set+1−s˜, is strictly increasing in both the size of the attack
and a worsening of fundamentals. If ut ≤ u∗(λt ), so that the peg does not collapse, set+1 is
equal to s˜. Conditional on the collapse of the peg (that is ut > u∗(λt )), we let set+1(ut ,λt )− s˜ ≥
rd (ut ). This means that speculators believe that speculation will be profitable when the peg
indeed collapses, which appears consistent with how speculative attacks develop in reality.5
From the perspective of speculator i , expected profit from attacking the weak currency is:
pie (xi t , fi t ;σt ) :=E
[
set+1(ut ,λt )|xi t
]− fi t . (5)
Speculator i would like to attack if and only if pie (xi t , fi t ;σt )> 0. Each speculator’s wealth is
equal to one unit of the weak currency. Since speculators are risk neutral, we may assume
that di t = 1 if speculator i attacks and di t = 0 otherwise. Her optimal decision depends on
the signal xi t and the joint strategy profile σt , and the forward rate fi t .6 Expected profit is
5This assumption is implicitly made in virtually all global game currency crises papers. Technically, the
assumption also guarantees that speculators find it optimal to attack when xi t ≥ h+², easing the application of
the global game technique, and simplifies the proof of our main theorem below.
6Given that speculators are small and have no influence on the value of λt and fi t , we can determine their
optimal strategy while treating these as being fixed.
12
decreasing in the forward rate, which is in turn influenced by the interest rate policy. Thus if
the policy maker sets rt sufficiently high, risk neutral speculators will postpone the attack
until the expected devaluation compensates for the risks they take when going short. In
equilibrium this risk will have a substantial impact on the behaviour of speculators.
5. Unique Equilibrium
5.1. Conditions for Equilibrium
A joint strategy profile σt describes the behaviour of all speculators and banks completely
for any distribution of signals. If, moreover, the joint strategy profile σt is symmetric, the
decisions of speculators and banks do not depend on which agent receives what signal, but
only on the aggregate distribution. In this case we can write speculative pressure, λt , simply
as a function of ut and the joint strategy profile σt . Indeed we have:
λt (ut ;σt )=
∫ 1
0
σsi t (xi t , fi t ) di
=
∫ 1
0
σsi t (xi t ,σ
b
i t (xi t )) di =
∫ 1
0
σsj t (xi t ,σ
b
kt (xi t )) di for all j ,k ∈ [0,1] (6)
= 1
2²
∫ ut+²
ut−²
σsj t (x,σ
b
kt (x)) d x for all j ,k ∈ [0,1].
An equilibrium of the model is a joint strategy profile such that three optimality conditions,
each following from the decision problems of agents, are satisfied simultaneously:
(I) Each speculator attacks if and only if the expected profit from the attack is positive;
(II) Banks set the forward rate in a way that rules out arbitrage opportunities from the
bank’s perspective;
(III) The policy maker sets rt so that she maintains end-of-period equilibrium on the spot
market for the weak currency at s˜ if she wishes to maintain the peg. Otherwise she sets
rt = rd (ut ).
We will now show that the model has a unique, symmetric equilibrium in which the choices
of banks and speculators depend on the private information they receive about ut . In fact, in
equilibrium speculators use the threshold strategies that are familiar from the global games
literature in general, in particular from Morris and Shin (1998). We start by defining threshold
strategies. Let i be a speculator. A threshold strategy for speculator i is a strategy, characterised
by a threshold value x, such that i attacks if and only if xi t ≥ x. A joint threshold strategy
around x is a (symmetric) joint strategy profile such that all speculators follow identical
threshold strategies, characterised by the number x. Such profiles only specify the signals at
which speculators attack, and not the strategies followed by banks. However, the following
result shows that this is without loss of generality.
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Lemma 2. Any symmetric equilibrium is completely characterised by specifying the signals at
which speculators attack.
Moreover, the threshold strategies considered in most global game currency crisis models are
also just strategies for speculators, so that this approach does not differ qualitatively from the
one in the literature.
Nevertheless, our model still differs from the standard global game currency crisis models
in that the actions of speculators are not obvious strategic complements. Of course, if the
attack succeeds and brings about a devaluation, it pays off to take part in a large attack,
because the resulting devaluation will be larger when more agents attack the peg. In this case,
there are clear strategic complementarities. However, if the attack on the currency peg is
unsuccessful, a larger amount of agents attacking the peg will only lead to a harsher defence
by the policy maker, so that the costs of speculation are higher. Therefore, speculators would
prefer to take part in a small rather than a large unsuccessful attack. In this case, actions are
strategic substitutes. Because Morris and Shin do not explicitly model the defence, they do not
have to deal with the reversed trade-off in case of an unsuccessful attack. As a consequence,
we cannot directly apply their arguments to our model. However, under assumption (1) we
have obtained the following, similar, result.
Theorem 3. (i) There is a unique equilibrium in joint threshold strategies. (ii) There are no
other equilibria, neither in symmetric nor in asymmetric joint strategy profiles.
In other words, the weak currency is attacked if and only if the fundamental deteriorates
beyond a certain threshold u ∈R, which is precisely the kind of equilibrium derived by Morris
and Shin (1998). In the “threshold equilibrium” two qualitatively different possible outcomes
can obtain. For low values of ut , speculators can expect a dogged defence of the currency peg.
For high values of ut , the defence will be lackluster. In any case, the forward rate will reflect
the kind of defence fairly—it will be low when the defence is lackluster, and high when it is
dogged—and the kind of defence only depends on the true fundamental ut . A speculator’s
signal thus reflects the likelihood of a dogged defence versus a lacklustre one.
Part (i) of theorem 3 is an immediate consequence of two lemmata we present next. The first
lemma shows that when a joint threshold strategy is used, the optimal behaviour of any given
individual speculator is also a threshold strategy.
Lemma 4. Let σt be any joint strategy profile such that (i) speculators use a joint threshold
strategy around x; and (ii) both banks and the policy maker use their optimal responses to the
joint threshold strategy. Then the optimal strategy for each individual speculator is a threshold
strategy, and the associated threshold value, denoted x∗(x), is a continuous function of x.
A value x is called a fixpoint of x∗ if x∗(x)= x. Lemma 4—which, in fact, does not depend
on assumption (1)—entails that every fixpoint of x∗ characterises an equilibrium in joint
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threshold strategies. Since x∗ is continuous, existence of an equilibrium follows from the
well-known Brouwer fixpoint theorem. Our next lemma then completes the proof of the first
part of theorem 3.
Lemma 5. The function x∗ has a unique fixpoint.
The “partial” lack of complementarities in our model is similar, though not identical,
to that in a model of Goldstein and Pauzner (2005). Theorem 3 generalises a similar result
obtained by these authors to our setting; in particular, assumption (1) plays a similar role in
our argument as the “single crossing condition” in that of these authors. The proof of part (ii)
of the theorem chiefly involves algebraic manipulation and is fully delegated to the appendix.
5.2. The Locus of the Threshold Equilibrium
Theorem 3 states that there is a unique equilibrium, in joint threshold strategies. What can
be said about the position of the speculators’ threshold inside the interval [`,h] in figure 2?
Carlsson and van Damme (1993) already observed that in a global game, an agent chooses
the action that gives the highest expected payoff when she is completely unsure about the
actions of others. With slight abuse du langage, this action may be called the “risk dominant
action” (this follows existing terminology for two player games). In our setup, this works
as follows. Consider a marginal speculator, that is, a speculator i who receives exactly the
signal x∗i that corresponds to the equilibrium threshold. For simplicity, assume ² is small.
7
The decision problem faced by speculator i is crucial to understand the position of the
speculators’ threshold, and makes clear why it is important to take the interest rate into
account. Recall that from i ’s perspective, the true value of ut is in the set [x∗i −², x∗i +²]. In
equilibrium, all speculators use the threshold strategy around x∗i . The uniformity of signals
implies that, on the interval [x∗i −², x∗i +²], λt increases linearly from the value 0 (at x∗i −²) to
1 (at x∗i +²). Even though i knows ut up to ², she faces much uncertainty about λt . Concretely,
if she attacks she faces the risk that speculators fail to coordinate successfully, even though
the currency is ripe for attack.
From speculator i ’s perspective, the expected devaluation of the weak currency is the
average devaluation on the ²-interval around x∗i . For small ² this is approximately:∫ λ∗
0
s˜ dλ+
∫ 1
λ∗
set+1(x
∗
i ,λ) dλ− s˜, (7)
where λ∗ solves u∗(λ∗)= x∗i . The forward rate fi t offered to speculator i reflects the average
interest rate around x∗i and is approximately equal to:
s˜+
∫ 1
0
r ∗(x∗i ,λ) dλ (8)
7The argument does not require that ² is small, but in this case equations (7) and (8) below take their simplest
form.
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Since all speculators attack around x∗i , bank i expects the policy maker to increase interest
rates sharply, to ward off speculative pressure. Thus the forward rate fi t will differ substan-
tially from s˜. For a marginal speculator, the expected devaluation of the weak currency, given
by equation (7), must be substantial, since it exactly compensates for the (substantial) cost
of attacking it, given by equation (8). Since the expected devaluation is increasing in ut , the
speculators’ threshold must be substantially to the right in the interval [`,h] and, moreover,
is increasing in the maximum interest rate r (u) that the policy maker is willing to use.
Morris and Shin (1998) model transaction costs, but not the effect of speculative activity
on the forward rate. Transaction costs are usually taken to be small and fixed (as also emerges
from the discussion by these authors in their Section III.B). In terms of our model, small
and fixed transaction costs are tantamount to assuming a very low value of r (ut ), that does
not vary with the amount of speculative pressure, or, in other words, to assuming that the
currency peg is not actively defended. Therefore, the model of Morris and Shin and Shin
predicts that the speculators’ threshold should be rather close to ` in the interval [`,h], in
other words, that speculators will attack en masse when the expected devaluation is still
modest, suggesting that the exchange rate will jump only slightly. In most of the subsequent
global games literature on currency crises (including the recent literature that incorporates a
role for interest rates, Angeletos et al. (2007) and Hellwig et al. (2006)), the size of devaluation
is taken to be large and is fixed exogenously, which makes a further comparison of this point
difficult.
Note that the impact of the interest rate on the cost of speculation has an important
policy implication for the effectiveness of other peg defences (e.g. sterilised intervention)
compared to the interest rate defence. A defence of the peg that is not based on the interest
rate instrument, but consists, say, of interventions in the spot market using foreign reserves,
will be less effective, as it does not raise the cost of speculation. In the absence of interest rate
hikes, the risks associated with speculation remain quite low.
This implication also distinguishes our approach from recent literature that emphasises
the signalling function of a defence policy (e.g. Drazen (2000), and—to a considerable extent—
Angeletos et al. (2007)). A precondition for an effective defence strategy based on signalling
is that the signal is costly for the policy maker, so that it reveals her tenacity. Sterilised
intervention in the spot market is costly for the policy maker because the central bank loses
foreign reserves, so fulfils this precondition. However, it does not substantially increase the
risk speculators face, and thus fails to exploit a more primitive aspect of the mechanics of
attack and defence. Although signalling effects may play an additional role, our model shows
that increasing the financing costs of speculators is the cornerstone of a successful defence.
5.3. A Dynamic Extension
Up to this point the discussion has focused on what we have called the intra-period model.
We can also consider a dynamic interpretation of the model, where the intra-period model
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is repeated over time as long as the currency peg is not abandoned. The fundamental ut is
driven by a process that makes moves between the periods. In each period, agents receive
new information on the fundamental. If the dispersion of this information, given by ², is
sufficiently small, this implies that each agent’s posterior on ut is approximately uniform
in each period, so that our intra-period results apply. A setup of this sort can be formalised
straightforwardly in the style of the multi-period model in Morris and Shin (1999). These
authors assume that the fundamental follows a persistent Markov process over time. This
is plausible if ut reflects the persistent variables such as unemployment or real currency
overvaluation that are typically considered to be driving factors underlying currency crises.
The persistence of ut translates into a persistent path for the policy choice variable rt over
time in the multi-period model.
6. Pressure on the ForexMarket
The model developed above is one of a pegged currency that comes under severe pressure. In
this section, we deal with the question how this pressure can be observed in practice, and
how to link this to the model. In the next section, we explore this connection to examine how
some of the model’s implications fit with reality.
In a floating exchange rate regime, exchange rate changes fully reflect tensions in the
market. But in case of exchange rate rigidity, policy makers ward off exchange rate changes
through policy measures, and the exchange rate change alone is no longer an appropriate
measure of pressure. To nevertheless obtain an indicator of forex market tensions, Girton and
Roper (1977) introduced the concept of exchange market pressure (EMP), which Weymark
(1995) then further formalised. These authors defined EMP for the domestic currency as the
relative depreciation required to remove excess supply of domestic currency on the forex
market in the absence of policy actions to offset that excess supply. This concept of EMP is
widely used in the literature.
Contrary to many of the currency crisis models in the literature, our model can be used to
derive an expression for EMP. Indeed, the key to deriving EMP endogenously in the model
is the expression we have for r ∗(ut ,λt ), which we obtain because we explicitly model the
interest rate defence. If the policy maker did not care about the currency peg, she would set
rt = rd (ut ), where rd (ut ) is the interest rate target based on domestic objectives.8 Recall that
r (ut ,λt , st ) is the interest rate that clears the spot market against exchange rate st . It follows
that if the policy maker (counter-factually) were to set rt = rd (ut ) in the face of speculative
pressure λt , the weak currency would depreciate vis-à-vis the strong currency from its fixed
rate s˜ to the value st that solves r (ut ,λt , st )= rd (ut ). More generally, let s(ut ,λt ,rd (ut )) be the
uniquely9 induced function such that r (ut ,λt , s(ut ,λt ,rd (ut )))= rd (ut ). Our model implies
8For sake of consistency with the theoretical model, we ignore other instruments that ward off pressure.
9Uniqueness requires the additional condition that the derivative of rt w.r.t. st is bounded away from 0.
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Figure 3: Exchange market pressure, the interest rate, and the exchange rate, as a function of ut
that EMP is equal to:
EMPt := s(ut ,λt ,rd (ut ))− s˜. (9)
Since the actual exchange rate equals st = s(ut ,λt ,rt ), EMPt can be expressed as:
EMPt = s(ut ,λt ,rd (ut ))− s(ut ,λt ,rt )+ s(ut ,λt ,rt )− s˜
=: wt (rt − rd (ut );ut ,λt )+∆st . (10)
The function wt is a “weighting” function. The expression ∆st is the change in the exchange
rate from t −1 to t . If the peg is abandoned, so that rt = rd (ut ), then EMPt is equal to the
devaluation of the currency compared to the fixed value s˜, so to ∆st . Therefore, the function
wt satisfies wt (0;ut ,λt ) = 0. Whenever the peg remains in place, EMPt is a monotonic
function of the wedge between the interest rate target based on domestic objectives and
the interest rate set by the policy maker at time t , that is, of r (ut ,λt )− rd (ut ).10 Using some
assumptions on the weight wt , and a method to proxy for rd , formula (10) can be used to
express EMPt as a function of the (observed) interest rate rt and (observed) exchange rate st
(and is more convenient than equation (9)). Note that EMPt is not identical to speculative
pressure λt . Speculative pressure is a partial determinant of EMPt , since rt is partly set in
response to λt . Yet λt might have been kept low because the policy maker sets rt sufficiently
high, which still indicates the presence of EMP.
Figure 6 shows the relationship between the fundamental ut , EMPt , and the depreciation
of the weak currency as predicted by the model. In the figure, the policy maker abandons the
currency peg when ut exceeds u. There is exchange market pressure at values of ut well below
the critical value u, revealed by the fact that the policy maker is forced to increase rt in order
10In the EMP literature, this wedge is sometimes expressed using rt −rt−1. Yet using r (ut ,λt )−rd (ut ) is in line
with the definition of EMP, as our model shows. Klaassen and Jager (2008) discuss this in a pure EMP setting.
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to maintain equilibrium in the spot market while, at the same time, worsening fundamentals
imply that rd decreases. This pressure is reflected by the fact that rt substantially exceeds
rd (ut ). The policy maker’s willingness to defend the peg keeps the speculators out, so that
λt remains low. For values of ut approaching u, EMPt increases sharply, because of vast
speculative activity. At the point u, speculators force the policy maker to abandon the
currency peg; since she does no longer wish to set rt to the interest rate r (ut ,λt ) that clears
the spot market at s˜, the exchange rate jumps. Since the marginal speculator attacks only if
expected profits compensate for a high forward rate, this jump must be substantial. Thus,
for values of ut to the right of the point u, EMPt reflects a sharp depreciation of the weak
currency vis-à-vis the strong currency. If the peg is abandoned, the currency depreciates (or
devalues) to its new equilibrium level. In the next period, EMP disappears from the market.
7. Relation to the Currency Crisis Literature
To substantiate that our model provides a good account of how currency crises develop in
reality, this section compares its implications for EMP with some time series data from the
empirical EMP literature, and reflects on how our model fares versus the traditional currency
crisis models. The EMP time series in this section are taken from Klaassen and Jager (2008),
who have developed an approach to derive EMP from observed data. They use observed
interest rates for r ∗t and suggest methods to proxy rd (ut ).
The focus in this section is on the 1992–1993 crisis in the European Monetary System
(“EMS”). The number of countries involved in the EMS crisis coupled to the absence of capital
controls during the crisis and absence of other, further complicating issues (for instance the
insolvency of governments, or a crisis in the banking sector), allow for the derivation of a
number of clean and comparable time series, and make this group of countries a natural
choice.11 Moreover, the availability of good data for this group of countries enables us to use
advanced methods for proxying rd , deriving it from a Taylor rule (see Taylor (1993)). For each
period we use the actual OECD forecasts that were made at that time for the expected inflation
and output gaps in the Taylor rule. From forex data we compute ∆st . Finally, to compute
EMPt in equation (10) we assume that the weighting function wt is constant, derived as in
Eichengreen et al. (1996), as this is the most common approach used in the EMP literature.
Figure 4 shows the EMP components and measure thus obtained, for the currencies of
France, Italy and the United Kingdom—three countries that suffered heavily under specula-
tive attacks—versus that of Germany, during the crisis.12 To illustrate the robustness of our
11E.g. Goderis and Ioannidou (2008) show empirically that high interest rates indeed defend currencies during
crises, but also that weak private sector balance sheets, in particular a large stock of short term debt, can negate
the efficacy of the defence. Such problems were absent during the EMS crisis.
12The Italian and U.K. authorities were forced to leave the EMS in September 1992. The French authorities
were forced to widen the EMS fluctuation band from 4.5% to 30% in August 1993.
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(a) Italy: pressure on the lira
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(b) United Kingdom: pressure on the pound
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(c) France: pressure on the franc
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Figure 4: Exchange Market Pressure during the 1992–1993 EMS crisis
approach, figure 5 also shows EMP time series for Thailand, South-Korea, and Indonesia,
countries that suffered during the 1997 East-Asian crisis. For these countries we do not have
real-time expectations data, so that we have to proxy rd with other means.
13 Since EMP is
expressed in terms of the counter-factual depreciation of the currency, it is measured on the
same (left hand) scale as ∆st .
While time series are not directly comparable to the static picture in figure 6, note that in
(the dynamic extension of) our model, EMPt will be a persistent process, provided that the
stochastic process that drives ut is persistent, so that its implications for EMPt can be easily
reinterpreted in the dynamic setting. Table 1 contains some economic indicators that may
be considered as candidates for the fundamental ut , all of which show persistence. We now
evaluate three strands of traditional models of currency crises against the background of the
13The EMP measures in these figures are based on interest rate differentials with the United States; see
Klaassen and Jager (2008) for details. Both the interest rate hikes and exchange rate increases were much bigger
during the East-Asian crisis than during the EMS crisis. Therefore, using more complex methods to derive rd
would lead to economically insignificant differences with the EMP measures shown in figure 5.
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Italy 1991 1992
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 *Q3 Q4
unemployment rate 8.6 8.5 8.4 8.6 8.7 8.7 9.0 8.9
current account (% of GDP) -2.8 -2.2 -1.5 -1.8 -3.5 -2.1 -1.8 -2.2
real overvaluation (†REER) 100 99 99 100 †100 100 101 90
United Kingdom 1991 1992
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 *Q3 Q4
unemployment rate 7.8 8.5 8.9 9.1 9.3 9.7 9.8 10.2
current account (% of GDP) -3.0 -1.7 -2.3 -0.2 -2.2 -2.5 -2.8 -0.8
real overvaluation (†REER) 104 101 100 100 †100 102 101 88
France 1992 1993
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 *Q3 Q4
unemployment rate 9.5 9.6 9.9 10.1 10.5 10.9 11.3 11.6
current account (% of GDP) -0.5 +0.6 +0.2 +0.8 -0.3 +0.5 +1.5 +1.1
real overvaluation (†REER) †100 101 103 105 105 105 101 102
* indicates the period of devaluation. † real effective exchange rate relative to 1992Q1. For unemployment and REER, period averages are
taken.
Data sources: IMF International Financial Statistics for current account and REER statistics, and OECD Main Economic Indicators for
unemployment statistics.
Table 1: Economic Indicators
EMS time series.
Virtually every analysis of the fundamentals of the countries involved in the EMS crisis
suggests that successful speculative attacks could have occurred much earlier. No major new
developments are seen in important economic indicators such as the real exchange rate, the
current account, and the unemployment rate (though all three countries experienced modest
increases in unemployment)—as can be seen from table 1. Reflecting on the evolution of
these fundamentals, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) observe: “The speculative attack on the
British pound in September 1992 would certainly have succeeded had it occurred in August—
so why did speculators wait?”; similar cases have been made for Italy and for France. This is at
odds with first generation-style explanations (e.g. Krugman (1979), Flood and Garber (1984))
since first generation currency crisis models typically predict that a speculative attack will
occur as soon as it is likely to succeed—predicting a negligible depreciation of the exchange
rate. There are exceptions, of course: Guimarães (2006) presents a first generation model
where the attack is possibly postponed, but this conclusion depends on the presence of
frictions on asset markets. Botman and Jager (2002) consider a first generation speculative
attack model with two vulnerable countries that cannot be distinguished a priori, so that it
takes some time before speculators manage to coordinate. However, our model does not
need such additional assumptions to explain the jump in the exchange rate.
As emerges from the theoretical exposition in section 5, also global game models predict
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(a) Thailand: pressure on the baht
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(b) South Korea: pressure on the won
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(c) Indonesia: pressure on the rupiah
* indicates the first period of substantial depreciation.
Figure 5: Exchange Market Pressure during the 1997 Asian crisis
that a currency will be attacked very quickly after it becomes vulnerable and that the jump in
the exchange rate will be modest—at least as far as they do not take into account defence
policies. In the basic global game speculative attack model, in which the only costs for
speculators are transaction costs, the dominant action is to attack the weak currency, for
almost all of the values of ut in the region where it is “ripe for attack”. This is because the
interest rate defence is not modelled, so that the expected profits of the speculators depend
only the expected depreciation of the weak currency versus transaction costs, which will
be small in comparison (a point also made by Chamley (2003)). In our model, the costs
associated with attacking the currency can be substantial, so that a large depreciation is
required to offset them; this induces speculators to postpone the attack.
Furthermore, the EMP measure suggests that the EMS crises did not come out of the
blue, but were the culmination of periods of growing pressure. For instance, figure 4 shows
that the September 1992 crisis of the lira did not come as a surprise, but was the climax of
a period of gradually increasing interest rates to offset accumulating pressure on the lira.
22
For the currencies of France, the United Kingdom, and of the Asian countries in figure 5
similar patterns emerge. Such protracted periods of growing pressure on forex markets are
not only at odds with first generation models and global game models, but also with the
second generation style explanations that suggest that the crises were triggered by a sudden
shift in sentiment on financial markets (e.g. Obstfeld (1996), Jeanne (1997), and Jeanne and
Masson (2000)). In contrast, our model predicts that a crisis may be preceded by period of
pressure on forex markets. Indeed, the analysis in figure 6 implies that while a full blown
crisis only erupts if the fundamental ut exceeds the critical threshold u, EMP emerges already
before this time. After all, the position of u depends on the risk associated with speculation,
and it may take a substantial period of time for the fundamental ut to reach it, during which
EMP gradually builds up.
8. Conclusion
During currency crises, policy makers undertake actions aimed at increasing the financing
costs of speculators, such as raising the interest rate. Any approach that abstracts from
these actions, and solely focuses on the policy makers’ decision whether or not to devalue
under speculative pressure, gives an incomplete picture. Much of the pressure on a currency
manifests itself through policy actions aimed at defending it, instead of through its eventual
depreciation. The literature on exchange market pressure deals with measuring stress on
forex markets using a combination of data on exchange rates and data on policy actions that
ward off pressure on the exchange rate.
Inspired by this literature, and basing ourselves on a discussion of the mechanics of spec-
ulation and the mechanics of a defence against such speculative activity, we have extended
the well-known global game speculative attack model of Morris and Shin (1998) by incorpo-
rating these mechanics into the model. In our extended model, the policy maker’s interest
rate defence is endogenous. Therefore, it is a hybrid model of exchange market pressure,
rather than just a model of the devaluation decision. We proved that the model has a unique
equilibrium, which is similar to the threshold equilibrium in the model of Morris and Shin.
The focus on the interest rate defence leads to a number of predictions that are broadly
consistent with how currency crises develop in practice. First, the model is consistent with the
persistent increase in pressure on forex markets that often precedes currency crises. Second,
the model suggests that a successful speculative attack will lead to a substantial jump of the
exchange rate following the attack, and shows this is due to the substantial risks involved with
speculation. Finally, the model may be used to clarify the timing of the attack. All of these
points touch upon weak spots of traditional currency crises models. The model in this paper
provides an explanation of these points based on quite primitive features of the interest rate
defence during currency crises.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. DefineB(ut ,λt ) := r (ut )− r (ut ,λt ). Since rλt is positive,B is decreasing in λt .
Since rut is positive, and r
′ is negative and bounded away from 0, there exist largest ` and least h
such thatB(`,λt )≥ 0 andB(h,λt )≤ 0 for all λt ∈ [0,1]. Under these conditions, the implicit function
theorem implies that there is a unique, continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing function u∗
with domain [`,h] such thatB(u∗(λt ),λt )= 0. ■
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose σ∗t is a symmetric equilibrium. Let d
∗
t (x) :=σs∗i t (x,σb∗i t (x)). Then d∗t (x)=
1 if and only if a speculator attacks when her signal is x. We will show σ∗—that is, each σs∗i t and each
σb∗i t —is fully determined by d
∗
t . First, substitution in equation (6) gives:
λt (ut ;σ
∗
t )=
1
2²
∫ ut+²
ut−²
d∗t (x) d x.
Using equation (2), we can now express the policy maker’s optimal interest rate decision as a function
of ut . Then by condition (III), that is, the spot market clears at s˜ whenever the policy maker prefers to
defend the currency peg, in this equilibrium the policy maker must set rt = r∗(ut ,λt (ut ;σ∗t )).
Next, we find the expectation value of the interest rate set by the policy maker from the per-
spective of bank i , which receives signal xi t . Since the policy maker maker’s decision is given by
r∗(ut ,λt (ut ;σ∗t )), this expectation value is:
E [rt |xi t ]= 1
2²
∫
Xi t
r∗(v,λt (v ;σ∗t )) d v =
1
2²
∫
Xi t
r∗
(
v,
1
2²
∫ v+²
v−²
d∗t (x)d x
)
d v, (11)
a function solely of the signals at which speculators attack and the bank’s own signal xi t . By condition
(II), bank i will set fi t = s˜+E [rt |xi t ] as given by equation (11).
Finally, by condition (I), speculator i attacks when expected profit from attacking, given by equa-
tion (5), is positive. Condition (I) now becomes:
1
2²
∫
Xi t
set+1
(
v,
1
2²
∫ v+²
v−²
d∗t (x)d x
)
d v − fi t > 0, (12)
and, for a given forward rate, a speculator’s decision depends solely on the signals at which speculators
attack and the speculator’s own signal xi t . In equilibrium, a speculator attacks if and only if inequality
(12) holds, so that σs∗i t (xi t , fi t ) is fully determined by d
∗
t for for all fi t . ■
Proof of Lemma 4. For arbitrary x ∈R, letσt (x) denote the joint threshold strategy around x. For fixed
σt (x), write speculative λt as a continuous and piecewise differentiable function of ut :
λt (ut ;σt (x))=

0 if ut ∈ (−∞, x−²)
ut−(x−²)
2² if ut ∈ [x−², x+²]
1 if ut ∈ (x+²,+∞)
(13)
By lemma 1, the inverse of u∗(λt ), denoted λ∗(ut ), is continuously differentiable and strictly decreas-
ing on the compact convex set [`,h]. Now, λ∗(`) = 1 ≥ λt (`;σt (x)) and λ∗(h) = 0 ≤ λt (h;σt (x)), so
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that by the intermediate value theorem, λ∗(ut ) and λt (ut ;σt (x)) have a (unique) intersection point,
which we denote by a∗(x). By the implicit function theorem a∗ is a continuous function of x near the
point a∗(x). If ut is to the left of the point a∗(x), speculative pressure falls short of bringing down the
peg; to the right the peg collapses.
Using equations (2) and (6) and the optimality of the policy maker’s interest rate decision, for
fixed σt (x), r∗(ut ,λt (ut ;σt (x))) is a function of ut , which is strictly increasing for ut ≤ a∗(x), and
decreasing and equal to rd (ut ) for ut > a∗(x). Now turn to bank i receiving signal xi t . From the bank’s
perspective, the true value of ut must be in the interval Xi t = [xi t −², xi t +²]. By optimality against
σt (x), the forward rate offered by the bank is:
fi t (xi t ;σt (x))= 1
2²
∫
Xi t
r∗(v,λt (v ;σt (x))) d v + s˜, (14)
which is continuous in xi t and in x (since r∗ is bounded).
Finally, turn to the speculator receiving signal xi t . From the speculator’s perspective, the true
value of ut must be in the interval Xi t = [xi t −², xi t +²], and the expected amount of depreciation is:
∆s(xi t ;σt (x))= 1
2²
∫
Xi t∩{v∈R | v>a∗(x)}
set+1(v,λt (v ;σt (x)))− s˜ d v. (15)
This expression is continuous and strictly increasing in xi t , since the integrand term is bounded
and strictly increasing in ut , and since the support Xi t ∩ {v ∈ R | v > a∗(x)} expands in xi t , and it is
continuous in x. pie (xi t ;σt (x))=∆s(xi t ;σt (x))− ( fi t (xi t ;σt (x))− s˜) and may be rewritten as:
1
2²
[∫
Xi t∩{v∈R | v>a∗(x)}
set+1(v,λt (v ;σt (x)))− s˜− rd (v) d v −
∫
Xi t∩{v∈R | v≤a∗(x)}
r∗(v,λt (v ;σt (x))) d v
]
.
This shows pie (xi t ;σt (x)) is continuous in xi t and x, negative when xi t ≤ a∗(x)−², strictly increasing
when xi t ≥ a∗(x)− ², and strictly positive when xi t ≥ a∗(x)+ ². There is a unique x∗ ∈ [`− ²,h+ ²]
(which depends onσ(x)), such that pie is strictly positive if and only if xi t > x∗. The optimal strategy
for speculator i is the threshold strategy around x∗(x).
By continuity we have that pie (x∗(x), fi t (x∗(x),σt (x));σt (x)) = 0. This implies that a∗(x) lies in
the interior of [x∗(x)− ², x∗(x)+ ²]. In this case pie is strictly increasing in xi t near x∗(x), so that
the implicit function theorem for locally one-one functions (e.g. Kumagai (1980)) implies that x∗(x)
is continuous at x. The threshold x was chosen arbitrarily, so x∗(x) is continuous at every point,
therefore continuous. ■
Proof of Lemma 5. The function x∗ is continuous and bounded by `− ² and h + ². Therefore the
set of fixpoints of x∗ is closed and bounded (thus compact) and, by the Brouwer fixpoint theorem,
non-empty. So x∗ has a least fixpoint x and a largest fixpoint x. For x ∈R, when agents use the joint
threshold strategyσt (x), λt increases linearly from 0 to 1 on the set [x−², x+²]. Let i be the speculator
receiving the signal x when agents use the joint threshold strategyσt (x). Sinceσt (x) is an equilibrium
and pie is continuous in xi t , speculator i must be indifferent:
pie (x;σt (x))=∆s(x;σt (x))− ( fi t (x;σt (x))− s˜)= 0, (16)
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where ∆s(xi t ;σt (x)) is defined as in equation (15), and fi t is given by:
fi t (x;σt (x))= 1
2²
[∫ a∗(x)−(x−²)
0
r (v + (x−²), v
2²
) d v +
∫ x+²
a∗(x)
rd (v) d v
]
+ s˜.
Suppose x 6= x and let j be the agent that receives the signal x when the joint threshold around x
(i.e.σt (x)) is used. This agent must also be indifferent, so that equation (16) holds with i replaced by
j and x replaced with x. Since λ∗(ut ) is a strictly decreasing function, we have a∗(x)− x > a∗(x)− x.
This means that the support of the integral in equation (15) is narrower under the signal x than under
x. Letting δ := (a∗(x)−x)− (a∗(x)−x), write f j t (x;σt (x)) as:
f j t (x;σt (x))= 1
2²
[∫ δ
0
r ((x−²)+ v, v
2²
)d v +
∫ a∗(x)−(x−²)
0
r ((x−²)+ v +δ, v +δ
2²
)d v +
∫ x+²
a∗(x)
rd (v) d v
]
+ s˜.
Since rd is decreasing in ut , and since s
e
t+1 is strictly increasing in ut , we find:∫ x+²
a∗(x)
set+1(v,λt (v ;σ(x)))− rd (v)d v −
∫ δ
0
r ((x−²)+ v, v
2²
)d v <
∫ x+²
a∗(x)
set+1(v,λt (v ;σ(x)))− rd (v)d v. (17)
(note here that the length of the supports of the two left hand side integrals combined are equal the
support of the right hand side integral; moreover, the integrand of the right hand side integral is
non-negative). Moreover, we will show that assumption (1) implies that:
∫ a∗(x)−(x−²)
0
r ((x−²)+ v +δ, v +δ
2²
) d v >
∫ a∗(x)−(x−²)
0
r ((x−²)+ v, v
2²
) d v. (18)
Equations (17) and (18) combined entail∆s(x)−( f j t− s˜)<∆s(x)−( fi t− s˜). This means that speculators
i and j cannot be both indifferent—and thus we conclude that x 6= x leads to a contradiction.
To see inequation (18), note that for the upper limits of these integrals we have:
r ((x−²)+a∗(x)− (x−²)+δ, a
∗(x)− (x−²)+δ
2²
)= r (a∗(x))
> r (a∗(x))= r (a∗(x)− (x−²)+ (x−²), a
∗(x)− (x−²)
2²
) (since r is strictly decreasing),
showing that at the upper limit of the support of the integral in the left hand side of (18) exceeds that
of the right hand side. If, for some v , the integrands are equal, then by assumption (1),
dr
d v
r ((x−²)+ v +δ, v +δ
2²
)= rut ((x−²)+ v +δ,
v +δ
2²
)+ 1
2²
rλt ((x−²)+ v +δ,
v +δ
2²
)
> dr
d v
r (v + (x−²), v
2²
)= rut (v + (x−²),
v
2²
)+ 1
2²
rλt (v + (x−²),
v
2²
)
(the inequality follows from (x − ²)+ v +δ < v + (x − ²)). Thus, using the fundamental theorem of
calculus and assumption (1) we see that, in equation (18), when moving from the upper to the lower
limits of the integrals, the left hand side integrand remains above that of the right hand side, so that
the inequality in indeed holds. ■
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Proof of Theorem 3(ii).14 Let σt be any equilibrium and let λ˜(ut ) be the fraction of speculators that
attack when the true fundamental equals ut . If σt is not a symmetric strategy, then λ˜(ut ) is a random
variable, since this fraction depends on which agents receive what signals (as well as on the true
fundamental ut ). Using the fact that in equilibrium banks and the policy maker use their optimal
responses to substitute for fi t , equation (5) becomes:
pie (xi t , fi t ;σt )= 1
2²
∫
Xi t
E
[
set+1(v, λ˜(v))
]
d v − s˜− 1
2²
∫
Xi t
E
[
r∗(v ; λ˜(v))
]
d v, (19)
which is a continuous function of xi t . Since σt is an equilibrium, speculator i speculates against the
weak currency if (19) is strictly positive, refrains from speculation if (19) is strictly negative, and is
indifferent when (19) vanishes. Let xbi t be the largest signal such that speculators do not strictly prefer
to refrain from attacking: xbi t := sup{xi t ∈ R | pie (xi t , fi t ;σt ) ≤ 0}. By continuity pie (xbi t , fi t ;σt ) = 0.
The derivative of pie (xi t , fi t ;σt ) w.r.t. xi t at xbi t exists and is strictly positive. (It is given by: s
e
t+1(x
b
i t +
²,1)− rd (xbi t + ²)−E
[
set+1(x
b
i t −², λ˜(xbi t −²))
]+E[r∗(xbi t −², λ˜(xbi t −²))] > 0). Assume σt is not a joint
threshold strategy. There must be speculators that attack when they receive signals smaller than
xbi t , and (by the continuity of pi
e ) in particular there is a largest signal xai t , satisfying x
a
i t < xbi t (since
the derivative of pie w.r.t. xi t is strictly positive at xbi t ), such that pi
e (xai t , f
a
i t ;σt )= 0. The sets X ai t and
X bi t may or may not be disjoint. Let C = X ai t ∩ X bi t , and Ua = X ai t −C , Ub = X bi t −C . We also denote
Ub =: [u1,u2]. Now, pie (xbi t , f bi t ;σt )=pie (xai t , f ai t ;σt )= 0 implies the following equality:∫
Ua
E
[
set+1(v, λ˜(v))
]−E[r∗(v ; λ˜(v))]− s˜ d v =∫
Ub
E
[
set+1(v, λ˜(v))
]−E[r∗(v ; λ˜(v))]− s˜ d v. (20)
Even if σt is not a symmetric equilibrium, the terms inside the expectation operators on the right
hand side of equation (20) are not random. In fact, the right hand side is equal to:∫ u2
u1
set+1(v,λt (v,σt (x
b
i t )))− r∗(v ;λt (v,σt (xbi t )))− s˜ d v, (21)
with λt (v,σt (xbi t )) defined as in equation (13). This is because u1 ≥ xai t +², so for any ut ∈ (u1,u2), a
speculator that receives the signal ut −² does not attack (we have xai t < ut −²< xbi t ); while a speculator
that receives the signal ut +² attacks (since xbi t < ut +²). Hence on the interval [u1,u2], λt increases
linearly as if speculators are using the joint threshold strategy around xbi t . We will denote the value of
expression (21) by Vb . Now rewrite the left hand side of equation (20) as:
Va :=E
[∫
Ua
set+1(v, λ˜(v))− r∗(v ; λ˜(v))− s˜ d v
]
.
Denote the term inside the remaining expectation operator by g (λ˜(v)). We claim:
14The proof of this part of the theorem adapts the argument given in part C of the proof of theorem 1 in
Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) to our model. The main difference is in the crucial last step of the proof (claim 1
below).
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Claim 1. For any possible distribution of signals on the true fundamental among agents:
g (λ˜(ut )) :=
∫
Ua
set+1(v, λ˜(v)− r∗(v ; λ˜(v))− s˜ d v <Vb . (22)
It follows straightforwardly that Va <Vb , yet this contradicts the equality in (20). The absurdity implies
that σt must be a joint threshold strategy after all, which proves the theorem.
Proof of claim 1. For any distribution of signals among agents and any η ∈ [−²,²] let i (η) be the
speculator and bank that receive the signal ut +η when the true fundamental is ut . Keeping the
relative distribution of signals among agents (the function i ) fixed, λ˜(ut ) can be written as
λ˜(ut )= 1
2²
∫ ²
−²
σsi (η)(η+ut ,σbi (η)(η+ut )) dη, (23)
thus can be regarded as a deterministic and continuous function of ut . Moreover, for any ut ∈ C ,
λ˜(ut )≤λt (u1;σt (xbi t )). To see this, note that C = [xbi t −², xai t +²] and that xai t +²= u1; in the evaluation
of expression (23), when moving from the lower end of C to its upper end, we “replace” speculators
receiving signals below xai t —who may or may not attack—with speculators with signals above x
b
i t who
always choose to attack. Thus, fixing i , λ˜ is monotonic on C .
First we will prove that Vb ≥ 0. If C =∅ then this follows from the fact that pie (xbi t , fi t ;σt ) = 0.
Otherwise, suppose that C 6=∅ and Vb < 0. This means that there are at least some ut ∈ [u1,u2] at
which the policy maker does not devalue. Since λt (ut ,σt (xbi t ))) increases on the interval [u1,u2], we
have λt (u1;σt (xbi t ))≤λt (ut ;σt (xbi t )), so the policy maker also does not devalue when the true state is
equal to u1. Since for all ut ∈C , and any distribution of signals λ˜(ut )≤λt (u1;σt (xbi t )), this implies she
does not devalue at any ut ∈C under any distribution of signals i . So:∫
C
set+1(v, λ˜(v))− r∗(v ; λ˜(v))− s˜ d v < 0. (24)
If Vb < 0, then inequality (24) holds for any distribution of signals; this contradicts that pie (xbi t , fi t ;σt ),
which is the sum of Vb and the expectation value of expression (24) is equal to 0.
For the rest of the proof of the claim, we keep the distribution of signals i fixed. We “pair” each
true state ut in the set X ai t with a state in the set X
b
i t , by setting ~ut = xai t + xbi t −ut . That is, ~ut is the
“mirror image” of ut , mirrored in the midpoint between xai t and x
b
i t . For each ut ∈ [u1,u2], we then
have λ˜(~ut )≤ λ˜(ut ). To see this, note C = [~u1,u1], and so λ˜(~u1)≤ λ˜(u1). As we move up from u1 to u2
on the interval [u1,u2] and evaluate expression (23), at first we have ut − ² ≤ xai t , which means we
“replace” speculators who may or may not attack at the signal ut −² with others who attack for sure
at the signal ut +²; at the same time, moving down from ~u1 to ~u2 we replace speculators who attack
for sure at ~ut +²≥ xbi t with others who may or may not attack at ~ut −². So λ˜(ut ) increases while λ˜(~ut )
decreases. Next, we have ut − ² > xbi t , and we replace speculators who do not attack at ut − ² with
others who do for sure at ut +², while we replace speculators who do not attack at ~ut +² with those
who may or may not at ~ut −². So λ˜(ut ) increases faster as ut moves up from u1 to u2 than λ˜(~ut ) as it
moves down from ~u1 to ~u2.
If the policy maker devalues when the true fundamental is equal to u1, then inequation (22) holds
28
and the proof is complete. This is because λt (ut ) is increasing on [u1,u2], so that in this case the policy
maker devalues for all ut ∈ [u1,u2]. Now, if the policy maker does not devalue at some ~ut ∈ [~u2, ~u1],
then set+1(~ut , λ˜(~ut ))− r∗(~ut , λ˜(~ut )) < s˜ < set+1(ut ,λt (ut ;σt (xbi t )))− rd (ut ); if, in contrast, the policy
maker devalues then λ˜(~ut )≤λt (ut ;σt (xbi t )) implies set+1(~ut , λ˜(~ut ))−rd (~ut )< set+1(ut ,λt (ut ;σt (xbi t )))−
rd (ut ). This shows that g (λ˜(ut ))<Vb must hold.
Finally we deal with the case where the policy maker does not devalue when the true fundamental
is u1. Suppose, contrary to the our claim, that g (λ˜(ut ))≥Vb ≥ 0. There must be ut ∈Ua = [~u2, ~u1] such
that the policy maker devalues (otherwise we would find g (λ˜(ut )) < 0). But, λ˜(~u1) ≤ λt (u1;σ(xbi t )),
and moreover the policy maker does not devalue when the fundamental equals u1. By continuity
v∗ =max{ut ∈Ua | rt (ut ; λ˜(ut ) = r (ut )}, the largest signal v∗ ∈Ua such that r (v∗) = rt (v∗; λ˜(v∗)), is
well-defined. Let ∆λ= λ˜(v∗)− λ˜(~u1) (note ∆λ> 0), and let z = v∗+2²∆λ−². We will be interested a
modification σˆt of the joint strategy profile σt :
for all speculators i ∈ [0,1],and all fi t , σˆsi t (xi t , fi t )=

1 if xi t ≤ z
0 if z < xi t ≤ ~u1−²
σsi t (xi t ,σ
b
i t (xi t )) otherwise.
Following equation (23), let ˆ˜λ(ut ) = 12²
∫ ²
−² σˆ
s
i (η)t (η+ut , f ) dη (note that, by construction, ˆ˜λ(ut ) is
independent of the choice of f ). Assume that when speculators use σˆt the policy maker sets rt to
rd (ut ) if ut < v∗, and that she sets rt = r (ut , ˆ˜λ(ut ) if ut ≥ v∗. (Of course, σˆt is not an equilibrium, but
this is not important for our argument.) In the joint strategy profile σˆt , let banks set fi t optimally with
respect to the policy maker’s interest decision.
The interval [~u2, ~u1] can now be decomposed in two parts. If ut ∈ [z+², ~u1], ˆ˜λ(ut ) is, by construc-
tion, constant and equal to λ˜(~u1). This is because, as we move through the region [~u2, ~u1], under the
profile σˆt speculators with signals ut −² do not attack the currrency (we have z < ut −²< ~u1−²), and
speculators with signals ut +² also do not attack the currency (we have xai t ≤ ut +²≤ xbi t ), so that ˆ˜λ(ut )
is constant. Moreover, compared to the profileσt , we replace speculators who attack by speculators
who don’t, so that for ut ∈ [z+², ~u1], ˆ˜λ(ut )≤ λ˜(ut ).
On the interval [~u2, z + ²), ˆ˜λ(ut ) decreases with derivative −1/(2²). This is because when ut ∈
[~u2, z+²), under the profile σˆt speculators with signals ut −² attack the currrency (we have ut −²< z)
and agents with signals ut +² do not attack the currency (we have xai t ≤ ut +²< xbi t ).
Finally, note that the profile σˆt is constructed such that
ˆ˜λ(v∗)= λ˜(v∗). (This is because ˆ˜λ(v∗)=
ˆ˜λ(z+²)+ z+²−v∗2² = ˆ˜λ(z+²)+∆λ= ˆ˜λ(~u1)+∆λ= λ˜(~u1)+∆λ= λ˜(v∗)). Now, letting D ⊆Ua be the subset
of fundamentals of Ua where the policy maker devalues under the joint strategy profile σt and the
distribution of signals i , we have:
g (λ˜(v))=
∫
[~u2,v∗]∩D
set+1(v, λ˜(v))− rd (v)− s˜ d v −
∫
[~u2,v∗]−D
r (v ; λ˜(v)) d v −
∫ ~u1
v∗
r (v ; λ˜(v)) d v
≤
∫
[~u2,v∗]∩D
set+1(v,
ˆ˜λ(v))− rd (v)− s˜ d v −
∫
[~u2,v∗]−D
r (v ; λ˜(v)) d v −
∫ ~u1
v∗
r (v ; ˆ˜λ(v)) d v
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(the above inequality holds since ˆ˜λ decreases at the fastest rate on [~u2, z + ²) and is constant on
[z+², ~u1], so we have ˆ˜λ(ut )≥ λ˜(ut ) for all ut ∈ [~u2, v∗], and ˆ˜λ(ut )≤ λ˜(ut ) for all ut ∈ [v∗, ~u1])
≤
∫
[~u2,v∗]∩D
set+1(v
∗+ (v∗− v), ˆ˜λ(v))− rd (v∗+ (v∗− v))− s˜ d v
+
∫
[~u2,v∗]−D
set+1(v
∗+ (v∗− v), ˆ˜λ(v))− rd (v∗+ (v∗− v))− s˜ d v −
∫ ~u1
v∗
r (v ; ˆ˜λ(v)) d v
(the inequality holds since set+1(ut ,λt ) is strictly increasing in ut and λt , rd (ut ) is non-increasing in
ut , and set+1(ut ,λt )− rd (ut )− s˜ ≥ 0 when λt ≥λ∗(ut ))
≤
∫ v∗
~u2
set+1(v
∗+ (v∗− v), λ˜(~v))− rd (v∗+ (v∗− v))− s˜ d v −
∫ ~u1
v∗
r (v ; ˆ˜λ(v)) d v
(combining the first two integral terms and using ˆ˜λ(v)≤ λ˜(~v)=λt (v,σt (xbi t )))
≤
∫ u2
~v∗
set+1(v, λ˜(v))− rd (v)− s˜ d v −
∫ ~u1
v∗
r (v ; ˆ˜λ(v)) d v (25)
(using “mirroring”, and because set+1(ut ,λt ) is increasing in ut , rd is non-increasing in ut , and v
∗+
(v∗−~v)≤ v for v ∈ [u1,u2]). Let v∗∗ ∈Ub be the (unique) point where r∗(v∗∗,λt (v∗∗,σ(xbi t )))= r (v∗∗).
Rewrite expression (25) as:
∫ u2
~v∗
set+1(v, λ˜(v))− rd (v)− s˜ d v −
∫ v∗+(v∗∗−u1)
v∗
r (v ; ˆ˜λ(v)) d v +
∫ ~u1
v∗+(v∗∗−u1)
−r (v ; ˆ˜λ(v)) d v.
The final integral term in this expression is negative. On the other hand Vb equals:
∫ u2
~v∗
set+1(v, λ˜(v))− rd (v)− s˜ d v −
∫ v∗∗
u1
r (v ; λ˜(v)) d v +
∫ ~v∗
v∗∗
set+1(v, λ˜(v))− rd (v)− s˜ d v,
and the final integral term is positive. To complete the proof of the claim it suffices to show that:
∫ v∗+(v∗∗−u1)
v∗
r (v ; ˆ˜λ(v)) d v ≥
∫ v∗∗
u1
r (v ; λ˜(v)) d v.
But r (v∗, ˆ˜λ(v∗))= r (v∗, λ˜(v))= r (v∗)> r (v∗∗)= r (v∗∗, ˆ˜λ(v∗∗)). The supports of these integrals are of
equal length. Using the fact that the support of the left hand integral is entirely below the support of
the right hand integral, assumption (1) implies that, when moving from the lower limit of the left hand
integral to its upper limit, the integrand remains above that of the right hand side integrand when
moving from the upper limit of the right hand side integral to the lower limit (the argument is similar
to that in the proof of lemma 5). The claim follows. ■
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